The final quarter of 2022 delivered a pair of U.S. federal actions that, taken together, set the operational clock ticking on post-quantum cryptographic migration across American government systems. The Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act became law in December, and OMB Memorandum M-23-02 directed agencies to begin inventorying vulnerable cryptographic systems. Meanwhile, the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking selected six sites across the EU to host Europe’s first quantum computers with over €100 million in investment, Germany committed €740 million to its DLR Quantum Computing Initiative, and Russia blocked efforts to add quantum technologies to the Wassenaar Arrangement’s control lists, fracturing the multilateral export control consensus. A new trilateral quantum cooperation statement from the Netherlands, France, and Germany signaled the consolidation of a European leadership bloc in quantum R&D.
United States: Federal PQC Migration Framework Takes Shape
What happened. Two complementary U.S. federal actions in the final weeks of 2022 established the operational framework for government-wide migration to post-quantum cryptography. On November 18, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum M-23-02, directing all Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to begin prioritized inventories of cryptographic systems, focusing on High Value Assets and systems rated FIPS 199 “High” on confidentiality. Then on December 21, President Biden signed the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act into law, having passed the House 420-3 and the Senate by unanimous consent. The act requires OMB to issue further migration guidance within one year of NIST finalizing its post-quantum cryptography standards, with five years of mandatory congressional reporting on agency progress.
Why it matters. The United States now has both an executive directive and a statutory mandate compelling federal agencies to migrate away from quantum-vulnerable encryption. This is not a study or a recommendation; it is a compliance regime with deadlines, inventory requirements, and annual congressional reporting. The practical effect is to create the largest coordinated cryptographic migration in history, affecting every federal civilian agency’s IT portfolio. For the private sector, the signal is clear: vendors serving federal customers will need post-quantum-ready products, and the procurement pipeline will increasingly filter for cryptographic agility. The law also sets the NIST standards, still in draft at the time, as the trigger for agency action plans, giving those standards de facto regulatory weight well beyond NIST’s traditional advisory role.
What remains unclear. The act exempted National Security Systems, which are governed separately under NSM-10. How agencies will fund the migration, given that no dedicated appropriation accompanied either the law or the memo, is an open question. The inventorying requirement alone represents a substantial resource burden for agencies with sprawling, legacy IT environments. Whether five years of congressional reporting will be sufficient to track what is likely to be a decade-long migration process is also uncertain.
Who should care. Federal CISOs and CIOs, IT vendors in the U.S. government market, cryptographic product developers, congressional appropriators responsible for agency IT budgets, and allied governments tracking the U.S. PQC migration as a precedent for their own planning.
European Union: EuroHPC Selects Six Sites for First Quantum Computers
What happened. On October 4, the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking announced the selection of six sites to host and operate Europe’s first quantum computers: IT4Innovations in Czechia, the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre in Germany, the Barcelona Supercomputing Center in Spain, GENCI/CEA in France, CINECA in Italy, and the Poznań Supercomputing and Networking Center in Poland. Each system will integrate a different quantum technology architecture (superconducting, trapped-ion, neutral atom, among others) into existing classical supercomputers, with a total planned investment exceeding €100 million, co-funded 50-50 by the EuroHPC JU and 17 participating states.
Why it matters. This selection transforms the EuroHPC quantum program from planning into procurement. The decision to distribute systems across six countries with different quantum hardware architectures is a deliberate strategy to avoid technological lock-in while building a geographically distributed user base. It also means that European researchers and companies will have access to multiple quantum platforms without depending on U.S. or Chinese cloud providers. The integration with existing supercomputers (MareNostrum 5 in Spain, Karolina in Czechia, Leonardo in Italy) positions these as hybrid classical-quantum systems, which is where near-term practical applications are most likely to emerge.
What remains unclear. The procurement timelines were optimistic, with systems expected to be available in the second half of 2023. Whether the European supply chain can deliver multiple distinct quantum architectures on schedule is an open question. How access will be allocated between national users and the broader EuroHPC user base has not been fully specified. The long-term sustainability of operating six different quantum architectures, each with distinct maintenance and upgrade requirements, also needs resolution.
Who should care. European quantum hardware companies bidding for EuroHPC contracts, HPC center operators at the six selected sites, researchers and industrial users planning quantum computing workflows, and policymakers in EU member states considering complementary national investments.
Germany: €740 Million DLR Quantum Computing Initiative
What happened. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action granted the German Aerospace Center (DLR) €740 million in funding over four years for the DLR Quantum Computing Initiative. On October 27, DLR awarded the first five contracts totaling €208.5 million specifically for ion-trap-based quantum computing to Universal Quantum Deutschland, eleQtron, NXP Semiconductors Germany, Parity Quantum Computing Germany, and QUDORA Technologies. The initiative covers multiple architectures, including ion traps, diamond-based approaches, quantum dots, and neutral atoms, with innovation centers in Hamburg and Ulm. Contracts ensure usage and patent rights remain with German industrial and research partners.
Why it matters. At €740 million, this is one of the largest single national quantum computing commitments in Europe, and it is structured explicitly to retain intellectual property within Germany. The DLR initiative sits alongside the separate EuroHPC program, giving Germany a two-track approach: European collaborative access through EuroHPC and sovereign capability development through DLR. The choice to fund multiple hardware architectures, rather than picking a winner, mirrors the EuroHPC approach but at a national scale. The emphasis on retaining patent rights is a clear industrial policy signal, positioning German companies to compete as quantum hardware suppliers rather than remaining dependent on foreign platforms.
What remains unclear. How the DLR initiative will coordinate with Germany’s participation in the EuroHPC quantum program and with the broader federal quantum strategy is not fully articulated. Whether five hardware architecture tracks can all produce competitive prototypes within four years, given the current state of the technology, is uncertain. The pathway from prototype development to commercial products that can sustain these companies beyond the funding period also remains to be defined.
Who should care. European quantum hardware startups and established defense contractors, German research institutions participating in the initiative, quantum computing end-users in German industry (automotive, chemicals, logistics), and policymakers in other EU member states weighing comparable sovereign investments.
Russia: Wassenaar Quantum Export Controls Blocked
What happened. During the 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement plenary cycle, Russia used its position as a participating state to block proposals to add quantum computing technologies to the regime’s dual-use control lists. The Wassenaar Arrangement requires unanimous consent to update its lists, and Russia’s objection prevented any multilateral agreement. Moscow’s use of its effective veto came after its further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, following which it blocked updates across multiple technology categories.
Why it matters. This veto exposed a structural weakness in the Wassenaar Arrangement that will shape quantum export control policy for years. With Russia inside the consensus-based regime, no multilateral quantum controls can be adopted through Wassenaar. The immediate consequence was the emergence of unilateral and small-group alternatives: Spain introduced national controls on quantum computers exceeding 34 qubits with certain error thresholds, and the United Kingdom announced new control entries. By 2024, an ad-hoc coalition of allied nations would implement quantum controls independently in what became known as the “Wassenaar minus one” approach. The fracturing of the multilateral export control framework means that quantum technology export restrictions will be patchy, with different countries applying different thresholds and definitions.
What remains unclear. Whether the “Wassenaar minus one” approach will achieve sufficient harmonization to be effective, or whether divergent national definitions of controlled quantum technologies will create compliance confusion for multinational companies. The appropriate technical thresholds for quantum export controls (qubit count, error rates, connectivity) remain contested. Whether Russia’s position will eventually lead to its formal exclusion from or the dissolution of the Wassenaar Arrangement is also an open question.
Who should care. Quantum hardware manufacturers with international customers, export compliance officers at technology companies, national export control authorities developing quantum-specific rules, and defense ministries assessing adversary access to quantum capabilities.
Netherlands, France, and Germany: Trilateral Quantum Cooperation
What happened. In November 2022, representatives of the Dutch, French, and German governments signed a joint statement committing to strengthen collaboration on quantum technologies to contribute to European strategic sovereignty. The three countries identified themselves as the leading EU member states in quantum R&D and startup ecosystems, and committed to a joint program of activities spanning quantum computing, communication, and sensing.
Why it matters. This trilateral bloc formalizes what was already an informal reality: the Netherlands, France, and Germany drive the majority of Europe’s quantum research output and house its most mature quantum startup ecosystems. By acting as a coordinated sub-group within the EU, they can set the pace for European quantum policy and steer funding priorities. The explicit invocation of “strategic sovereignty” signals that these three governments view quantum technology as a domain where Europe must avoid dependence on non-European suppliers, a theme that connects to the EuroHPC selection’s emphasis on European-built hardware and Germany’s insistence on domestic patent retention.
What remains unclear. Whether the trilateral will develop into an operational program with shared funding and joint projects, or remain a political signal. How other EU member states with growing quantum ambitions (Spain, Italy, Finland) will relate to a leadership group that has declared itself the top tier is politically sensitive. The relationship between this trilateral and the broader EU Quantum Flagship governance also needs definition.
Who should care. EU member states outside the trilateral, European Commission officials managing quantum programs, quantum startups in the three participating countries seeking cross-border collaboration, and non-European governments assessing European quantum policy coherence.
South Korea: Quantum Designated Among 12 National Strategic Technologies
What happened. The Korean government designated quantum science and technology as one of 12 National Strategic Technologies at the first meeting of the National Science Technology Advisory Board, chaired by President Yoon Suk Yeol. Quantum was classified as one of three “game-changing” sectors alongside AI/semiconductors and advanced biotechnology. The government committed KRW 25 trillion (approximately $19 billion) over five years to R&D across all 12 technologies. Separately, the National Security Research Institute and National Intelligence Service launched Round 1 of the Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography competition with 16 candidate algorithms, pursuing sovereign cryptographic standards parallel to NIST’s global process.
Why it matters. South Korea’s dual moves place the country among the small group of nations treating quantum as both a technology development priority and a cryptographic sovereignty concern. The KpqC competition is one of only a handful of national PQC standardization efforts running in parallel to NIST’s, joining similar work in China and, to a lesser degree, in the EU. This reflects a calculation that relying solely on NIST-selected algorithms carries supply chain and trust risks that a technology-advanced nation should hedge against. The presidential-level designation of quantum as a “game-changing” strategic technology also elevates it above routine R&D budget line items, likely ensuring sustained funding even through political transitions.
What remains unclear. How much of the KRW 25 trillion five-year commitment will be allocated specifically to quantum, as opposed to the other 11 designated technologies. Whether the KpqC competition will produce algorithms that are adopted broadly in Korean industry or remain confined to government and defense applications. How South Korea will reconcile its parallel PQC standards with the emerging international consensus around NIST-selected algorithms in commercial interoperability contexts.
Who should care. Korean quantum technology companies and research institutions, international quantum firms seeking partnerships in the Korean market, cryptographic product vendors targeting East Asian government customers, and allied governments tracking sovereign PQC standardization efforts.
Also in October–December 2022
The Austrian physicist Anton Zeilinger received the 2022 Nobel Prize in Physics jointly with Alain Aspect and John Clauser for experiments establishing the violation of Bell inequalities, reinforcing Austria’s standing in quantum research and drawing public attention to the field’s scientific foundations.
CERN joined a coalition of partners including the University of Geneva, ETH Zurich, EPFL, Microsoft, and IBM in proposing the creation of an Open Quantum Institute at the 2022 GESDA Summit, aiming to ensure quantum technologies address societal challenges, with an incubation phase planned for 2023.
Italy formally launched its National Quantum Science and Technology Institute (NQSTI) with approximately €138 million from the EU’s NextGenerationEU program, establishing a hub-and-spoke network of 20 entities covering the full quantum innovation chain from fundamental research to startup incubation.
The OECD Digital Economy Ministerial Meeting announced the creation of the Global Forum on Technology, with quantum computing named among its initial focus areas, marking the OECD’s formal entry into quantum technology governance as a dedicated workstream.
Detailed analysis of each development in this briefing, including cross-jurisdictional impact assessments and implementation tracking, is available to Quantum Policy Radar subscribers.