The first quarter of 2022 was defined by two forces: the rapid expansion of dual-use export controls in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and a parallel acceleration of quantum-specific policy actions across multiple continents. The EU imposed blanket bans on dual-use exports to both Russia and Belarus within a single week, affecting the full scope of items in the EU Dual-Use Regulation. In the United States, President Biden signed NSM-8, the first White House national security directive to require planning for quantum-resilient cryptography, while the NSTC published its first strategic plan on quantum sensing. Israel committed NIS 200 million to build its first quantum computer, with the Weizmann Institute demonstrating a working ion-trap system weeks later. Taiwan launched its cross-ministerial National Quantum Team. And France’s ANSSI published the most detailed European government position paper on the post-quantum cryptography transition to date.
European Union: Blanket Dual-Use Export Bans on Russia and Belarus
What happened. On February 25, 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328, imposing a blanket prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of all dual-use goods and technology to any person in Russia or for use in Russia. The regulation replaced the prior framework, which had restricted dual-use items only when intended for military use or a military end-user. A new Annex VII extended controls to electronic components, semiconductors, sensors, and other technology items corresponding to the U.S. Commerce Control List. On March 2, the EU adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/355, mirroring these restrictions against Belarus. Both sets of measures entered into force within days of adoption.
Why it matters. These regulations marked the EU’s most extensive export control action in decades. By moving from targeted military end-use restrictions to blanket prohibitions, the EU effectively cut Russia and Belarus off from the full range of items governed by the Dual-Use Regulation, including quantum-relevant technologies such as cryogenic systems, precision measurement instruments, and advanced electronics. The speed of adoption (within 72 hours of the invasion for Russia, and one week later for Belarus) demonstrated that the EU could act on export controls without the multi-year consensus processes typical of multilateral regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement. The inclusion of a supplementary annex covering items beyond the standard dual-use list signaled a willingness to align EU controls more closely with U.S. export restriction categories.
What remains unclear. Whether enforcement will be consistent across all 27 member states, given the decentralized licensing structure. How effectively the EU will prevent circumvention through third countries. Whether Russia’s expected veto of new Wassenaar Arrangement listings will push the EU toward establishing its own autonomous emerging-technology control categories, particularly for quantum computing hardware.
Who should care. European manufacturers and distributors of cryogenic, photonic, and precision measurement equipment. Quantum technology companies with supply chains touching Russian or Belarusian entities. Export compliance teams at dual-use equipment firms. Legal advisors monitoring sanctions enforcement divergence across EU member states.
United States: NSM-8 Introduces Quantum-Resilient Cryptography Requirements
What happened. On January 19, 2022, President Biden signed National Security Memorandum 8 (NSM-8), titled “Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community Systems.” The directive required the NSA to update its cryptographic equipment modernization guidance within 60 days, specifically referencing quantum resistant protocols. Federal agencies operating national security systems were given 180 days to identify all encryption instances not in compliance with NSA-approved quantum resistant algorithms and report their findings. The memorandum also prohibited agencies from authorizing new systems that do not use approved encryption algorithms, absent a head-of-agency exception.
Why it matters. NSM-8 was the first White House national security directive to explicitly reference quantum-resilient cryptography in the context of federal cybersecurity planning. While the directive applied only to national security systems (not civilian federal systems or the private sector), it established concrete timelines: 60 days for updated guidance, 90 days for a prioritized policy review, and 180 days for an encryption inventory. This created a compliance clock for agencies that had previously been able to defer quantum readiness indefinitely. NSM-8 also laid the groundwork for the more detailed NSM-10, signed in May 2022, which would extend these obligations and set a 2035 migration target.
What remains unclear. How agencies will handle the gap between the 180-day inventory deadline and the absence of finalized NIST post-quantum cryptography standards (which were not announced until July 2022). Whether the private sector, which NSM-8 does not address, will take voluntary action or wait for separate mandates. The extent to which allied governments will align their own cryptographic migration timelines with the U.S. schedule.
Who should care. Chief information officers and chief information security officers at U.S. defense and intelligence agencies. Defense contractors operating national security systems. Vendors of cryptographic products seeking federal certification. Cybersecurity policy teams at allied governments watching for signals on transition timelines.
Israel: NIS 200 Million Committed to Build First Quantum Computer
What happened. On February 15, 2022, the Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) and the Defense Ministry’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development (MAFAT) announced a joint allocation of NIS 200 million (approximately USD 62 million) to build Israel’s first quantum computer. The funding supported two parallel tracks: the IIA focused on computational infrastructure including cloud access, while MAFAT was tasked with establishing a national center to develop a quantum processor in partnership with academia and industry. Weeks later, in early March, researchers at the Weizmann Institute of Science unveiled WeizQC, an ion-trap quantum computer described as one of fewer than 10 such systems worldwide.
Why it matters. The dual-track funding structure, split between a civilian innovation authority and a defense research directorate, reflects a model where quantum computing is treated simultaneously as an economic development priority and a national security imperative. Israel’s investment is modest compared to those of the United States, China, or the EU, but its concentration of resources on a single defined objective (building a working quantum computer) contrasts with the broader, more diffuse strategies adopted by larger states. The near-simultaneous Weizmann announcement suggested that Israeli academic capacity was already sufficient to produce early-stage hardware, making the government funding a scaling mechanism rather than a seed investment.
What remains unclear. Which qubit modality the MAFAT national center will pursue, and whether it will build on the Weizmann Institute’s ion-trap work or pursue a separate approach. How the civilian and defense tracks will share findings, given the classification constraints typical of MAFAT projects. Whether the NIS 200 million allocation represents a one-time commitment or the first installment of a larger program.
Who should care. Israeli quantum startups and research groups seeking government contracts. Defense technology firms in Israel’s procurement ecosystem. International quantum hardware companies assessing partnership opportunities. Policymakers in small and mid-sized advanced economies designing their own quantum investment structures.
France and New Zealand: Two Approaches to PQC Transition Guidance
What happened. On January 4, 2022, France’s ANSSI published a position paper on the post-quantum cryptography transition, outlining a three-phase roadmap. Phase one emphasized hybrid mechanisms combining pre-quantum and post-quantum algorithms. Phase two, beginning not earlier than 2025, would maintain mandatory hybridization with claimed quantum resistance. Phase three, not before 2030, would allow standalone post-quantum cryptography. ANSSI indicated that first French security certifications for hybrid PQC products were expected around 2024 or 2025. Separately, in January 2022, New Zealand’s GCSB released NZISM version 3.5, adding a new section advising government agencies to inventory cryptographic assets and begin planning for migration to post-quantum standards, while noting that no algorithms had yet been approved for NZISM use.
Why it matters. These two publications illustrate a divergence in how governments are approaching PQC transition guidance at this stage. ANSSI’s position paper is prescriptive: it commits to a phased timeline, mandates hybridization as an interim measure, and anchors the transition in a certification process that ANSSI itself controls. New Zealand’s approach is preparatory: it directs agencies to inventory and plan but defers algorithm approval until NIST standards are published. Both approaches are reasonable given the different positions of the two countries in the global standards ecosystem (France as a producer of cryptographic standards, New Zealand as a consumer aligned with Five Eyes). The ANSSI paper’s insistence on hybrid mechanisms, rather than a direct switch to post-quantum algorithms, reflects a conservative posture that prioritizes continuity of assurance over speed of adoption.
What remains unclear. Whether other European national cybersecurity agencies will follow the ANSSI hybridization model or adopt different transitional approaches, creating potential interoperability friction. How quickly NIST’s eventual standard selections will be reflected in NZISM and other Five Eyes guidance. Whether ANSSI’s 2025 and 2030 phase gates will hold or slip as the underlying standards mature.
Who should care. Vendors of cryptographic products seeking EU and Five Eyes government certifications. National cybersecurity agencies in countries that have not yet issued PQC guidance. Common Criteria certification bodies. Enterprise IT teams at multinational organizations operating across both regulatory environments.
Taiwan: National Quantum Team Launches With 17 Research Groups
What happened. In March 2022, Taiwan formally launched its cross-ministerial National Quantum Team, selecting 17 interdisciplinary research groups from academia and industry. The NSTC, Academia Sinica, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs jointly announced the selections at a March 16 press conference. The program, developed over two years of assessment and planning, organized 72 project directors and 24 IT companies around four development directions: quantum computing hardware, photonic quantum technologies, quantum software, and application development.
Why it matters. Taiwan’s approach is distinctive for its emphasis on structured selection and its explicit integration of the island’s semiconductor and photonics industry base into a quantum development strategy. The involvement of 24 IT companies alongside academic researchers signals an intent to build on Taiwan’s existing manufacturing strengths rather than replicating the pure-research models favored in Europe. The five-year program horizon and cross-ministerial governance structure suggest a sustained commitment, though the investment scale (drawn from a previously announced NT$8 billion, approximately USD 270 million) is smaller than programs in the United States, the EU, or China.
What remains unclear. How Taiwan will handle the intersection of its quantum ambitions with escalating geopolitical tensions over Taiwan’s semiconductor sector. Whether the photonic quantum technologies track will attract international collaboration or be treated as a sensitive technology area. How the program’s progress will be evaluated, given that the selection criteria emphasized both “ambition and feasibility.”
Who should care. Semiconductor and photonics companies with existing Taiwan operations. International quantum research groups seeking collaboration with Taiwanese institutions. Policymakers in the Indo-Pacific tracking technology sovereignty strategies. Investors in quantum photonics companies assessing potential partners.
United States: NSTC Publishes Quantum Sensing Strategic Plan
What happened. On March 24, 2022, the NSTC Subcommittee on Quantum Information Science released “Bringing Quantum Sensors to Fruition,” a strategic plan setting out recommendations for accelerating quantum sensor development over a 1-to-8-year horizon. The report identified four policy recommendations: accelerate new sensing approaches through end-user partnerships; streamline technology transfer and acquisition; invest in enabling technologies such as laser systems and integrated optics; and improve interagency coordination through the SCQIS. The plan named seven federal end-user agencies, from NIH to the Department of Defense.
Why it matters. Quantum sensing is the most mature of the three main quantum technology pillars (computing, communications, sensing), yet it has received less policy attention than the other two. This report represented the first dedicated U.S. strategy document for quantum sensors, signaling that the federal government views sensor commercialization as a near-term priority rather than a long-horizon research aspiration. The report’s focus on bridging the gap between laboratory development and field deployment, particularly through partnerships between research agencies and operational end-users, addressed a persistent weakness in the U.S. quantum technology pipeline. The explicit naming of seven end-user agencies created institutional stakeholders with incentives to pull quantum sensor products toward operational readiness.
What remains unclear. Whether dedicated funding will follow the strategic plan, or whether agencies will be expected to redirect existing quantum research budgets. How the plan’s recommendations will interact with the CHIPS and Science Act provisions then moving through Congress. Whether defense and intelligence applications will absorb the majority of early quantum sensor deployments, leaving civilian agencies with slower access.
Who should care. Quantum sensing startups and their investors. Program managers at DOE, DOD, NSF, and other named agencies. Defense prime contractors building position, navigation, and timing systems. Academic researchers working on atomic clocks, magnetometers, and gravimeters who may see new partnership pathways.
Also in January–March 2022
Spain launched the CUCO project, its first major public-private quantum computing consortium, bringing together seven companies and five research centers to develop quantum algorithms for energy, finance, space, defense, and logistics applications under the Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan.
India’s DRDO and IIT Delhi demonstrated quantum key distribution over more than 100 km of commercial-grade optical fiber between Prayagraj and Vindhyachal, the country’s first intercity QKD link, with DRDO describing it as indigenous technology capable of bootstrapping military-grade communication security.
Poland’s PSNC joined the IBM Quantum Network as the first IBM Quantum Innovation Center in Central and Eastern Europe, funded through a special-purpose subsidy from the Prime Minister and positioned as the national access point for IBM quantum resources.
Slovenia adopted its Strategy for the Digital Transformation of the Economy, formally including quantum computing among the government’s technology priorities for the first time, with funding of up to €56.5 million through 2024 drawn from the national Recovery and Resilience Plan.
For detailed cross-jurisdictional analysis and sector-level implications of the developments covered in this briefing, including export control mapping and PQC transition comparisons, see the Quantum Policy Radar.