January 2024 saw the creation of the first dedicated international standards body for quantum technologies, with ISO and IEC establishing Joint Technical Committee 3 under South Korean chairmanship and a UK secretariat. Germany’s Bundeswehr completed deployment of quantum-resistant encryption across its 13,000-kilometer fiber backbone, one of the first confirmed military-wide PQC implementations. China’s Origin Quantum launched the country’s most advanced domestically built quantum computer and opened it to global cloud users, while Russia and China reported a successful 3,800-kilometer satellite-based quantum communication test with explicit framing around a potential BRICS network. NATO published the summary of its Quantum Technologies Strategy, and the World Economic Forum and UK Financial Conduct Authority issued the first global regulatory roadmap for quantum security in financial services.
ISO/IEC Establish Joint Technical Committee 3 on Quantum Technologies
What happened. On January 11, ISO and IEC announced the creation of JTC 3, only the third joint technical committee in the two organizations’ history. The committee’s scope covers quantum computing, simulation, sources, metrology, detectors, communications, and fundamental quantum technologies. South Korea was named chair, and the British Standards Institution was designated as secretariat. The proposal originated from BSI following an IEC advisory group recommendation.
Why it matters. JTC 3 fills a structural gap. Until now, quantum standardization work was scattered across existing subcommittees of JTC 1, IEC TC 86, and IEC TC 47, with no coordinating body and no unified scope. The decision to create an entirely new committee, rather than a subcommittee under JTC 1, signals a consensus among national standards bodies that quantum technologies require their own governance track. South Korea’s chairmanship and the UK’s secretariat role give those two countries early structural influence over the terms, definitions, and interoperability frameworks that will eventually shape procurement specifications and regulatory requirements worldwide. For countries that have not yet engaged in the JTC 3 process, the window for shaping foundational standards is narrowing.
What remains unclear. How JTC 3 will manage the boundary between its scope and the quantum-related work already underway in JTC 1 subcommittees and IEC technical committees is not yet defined. Whether the committee will address post-quantum cryptography standards or defer entirely to existing bodies (such as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) is an open question with significant implications for the coherence of the overall standards architecture.
Who should care. National standards bodies deciding whether to participate in JTC 3 working groups. Quantum hardware and software companies whose products will eventually need to conform to JTC 3 outputs. Government procurement officers writing specifications for quantum-related acquisitions. PQC implementers uncertain about how cryptographic and quantum technology standards will interact.
Germany: Bundeswehr Wide Area Network Receives Quantum-Resistant Encryption
What happened. BWI GmbH, the IT service provider for the German armed forces, announced the completion of a three-year modernization of the Bundeswehr’s approximately 13,000-kilometer fiber optic backbone. The network now carries quantum-resistant encryption by default, with PQC technology approved by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for classified information up to the VS-NfD level. BWI stated the encryption is used by default and cannot be switched off.
Why it matters. This is one of the first confirmed deployments of PQC across an entire military-grade national network. The “on by default, cannot be switched off” design is notable: it treats quantum-resistant encryption not as an optional upgrade but as a baseline infrastructure requirement. The Bundeswehr’s approach contrasts with most other defense establishments, where PQC remains in testing or pilot phases. Germany’s BSI approval for classified use up to VS-NfD also provides a reference point for other NATO allies assessing their own PQC readiness timelines.
What remains unclear. Whether the implementation covers only the backbone transport layer or extends to end-user devices and application-level encryption. The specific PQC algorithms deployed have not been publicly identified, making it difficult to assess whether the Bundeswehr’s choices align with the NIST PQC standards that were finalized later in 2024. Whether other NATO members are pursuing similar network-wide deployments, or treating the Bundeswehr’s approach as a template, is not publicly known.
Who should care. NATO defense planners and allied military CISOs benchmarking their own PQC migration timelines. European defense contractors whose systems must interface with the Bundeswehr network. PQC algorithm developers and BSI-approved vendors. Policymakers in other nations considering mandatory PQC deployment schedules for defense infrastructure.
China Launches 72-Qubit Origin Wukong with Global Cloud Access
What happened. On January 6, Origin Quantum Computing Technology launched Origin Wukong, a 72-qubit superconducting quantum computer, at its facility in Hefei. The system was made available for global cloud access, attracting over 8 million remote visits from more than 120 countries in its first three months. Separately, on January 20, Taiwan’s Academia Sinica unveiled a domestically built 5-qubit quantum computer completed ahead of schedule, while Taiwan’s NSTC set a target to produce a domestically developed quantum computer by 2027.
Why it matters. Origin Wukong’s launch represents the completion of a fully indigenous Chinese superconducting quantum computer manufacturing chain. Origin Quantum’s decision to open the system to global cloud users, including from the United States, positions China as a provider of quantum computing access rather than solely a consumer of Western platforms. The contrast with Taiwan’s 5-qubit achievement and 2027 timeline illustrates the widening gap in quantum hardware capability across the Taiwan Strait, a gap with implications for both countries’ semiconductor and advanced computing strategies. For China, the system also demonstrates the viability of its quantum chip production line and third-generation control system, both of which are prerequisites for scaling to larger processors.
What remains unclear. The fidelity and error rates of Origin Wukong’s qubits have not been independently benchmarked, making direct comparisons with IBM or Google processors unreliable. Whether the cloud platform’s global accessibility will be maintained given increasing export control scrutiny (Origin Quantum was later placed on the US Entity List in May 2024) is an open question. The commercial viability of the system beyond research and educational use has not been demonstrated.
Who should care. Export control policymakers tracking Chinese quantum hardware capabilities. Western quantum computing companies assessing competitive positioning. Taiwan’s NSTC and related agencies calibrating their own development timelines. Researchers and companies in countries without domestic quantum computing platforms evaluating cloud access options.
Russia and China Report Satellite-Based Quantum Communication Test, Float BRICS Network
What happened. In early January 2024, reports emerged that Russian and Chinese scientists had successfully transmitted quantum-encrypted images over 3,800 kilometers using China’s Mozi satellite, between ground stations near Moscow and Urumqi. Russian researcher Alexey Fedorov stated that a quantum communication network among BRICS nations was “technically absolutely possible.” Russia has proposed joint quantum technology initiatives with BRICS partners.
Why it matters. The test demonstrates that China’s satellite-based QKD infrastructure, which no other country has replicated at comparable scale, can be extended to partner nations. The explicit BRICS framing is the most significant policy signal: it positions quantum communication as a tool for building a parallel, non-Western secure communications architecture. If realized, such a network would allow participating nations to bypass Western communications infrastructure entirely for sensitive traffic. The geopolitical implications are substantial, particularly as NATO and EU member states pursue their own quantum communication networks (such as EuroQCI) on different technological and governance foundations.
What remains unclear. The test relied on China’s Mozi satellite, meaning Russia currently depends on Chinese infrastructure for long-distance quantum communication. Whether Russia will develop its own quantum satellite capability, and on what timeline, affects the power dynamics within any BRICS quantum network. India’s willingness to participate remains uncertain, with reports of reluctance due to security concerns about China. The practical scalability of satellite-based QKD for routine use, beyond demonstration transmissions, has not been established.
Who should care. Intelligence and defense agencies in NATO countries monitoring non-Western communications infrastructure development. Diplomats tracking BRICS cooperation dynamics. EuroQCI planners assessing the competitive and strategic context for Europe’s own quantum communication network. Satellite communications and QKD companies evaluating the market for space-based quantum infrastructure.
NATO Publishes Quantum Technologies Strategy Summary
What happened. On January 17, NATO released a public summary of its Quantum Technologies Strategy, approved by Foreign Ministers in November 2023. The strategy outlines desired outcomes including identification of dual-use quantum applications for defense, development of interoperability frameworks, cooperation among Allies, and the transition of NATO’s cryptographic systems to quantum-safe cryptography. The summary also identifies talent as “one of the most critical resources in the pursuit of quantum advantage” and calls for action to prevent adversarial investment and interference in Allied quantum ecosystems.
Why it matters. The strategy’s publication establishes the first Alliance-wide policy framework specifically for quantum technologies. Its coverage of both offensive potential (dual-use applications for defense planning) and defensive requirements (quantum-safe cryptography across all domains) gives NATO member states a reference document for aligning national quantum programs with collective defense needs. The voluntary language on preventing adversarial investment suggests political limits on how far Allies are willing to go in restricting foreign participation in their quantum sectors. The strategy’s treatment of talent as a critical resource signals that Alliance-level workforce coordination may follow, a domain where NATO has limited institutional experience.
What remains unclear. The published document is a summary, not the full strategy; the operational details, timelines, and resource commitments remain classified or internal. How the strategy will interact with individual Allies’ national quantum strategies, particularly where these set different priorities or timelines, is not addressed in the public text. Whether NATO will develop binding interoperability standards or rely on voluntary harmonization is an open question with practical consequences for procurement.
Who should care. Defense ministries and national quantum program managers in NATO member states. Defense contractors developing quantum-related products for Alliance markets. PQC vendors anticipating NATO-wide cryptographic migration. Workforce development agencies in Allied countries considering whether NATO coordination will affect their programs.
WEF and UK FCA Issue First Global Roadmap for Quantum Security in Financial Services
What happened. On January 17, the World Economic Forum and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority published a white paper titled “Quantum Security for the Financial Sector: Informing Global Regulatory Approaches.” The paper projects financial sector quantum investment reaching $19 billion by the 2030s and proposes four guiding principles: reuse existing frameworks, establish non-negotiable baseline security requirements, increase transparency through information-sharing, and avoid regulatory fragmentation across jurisdictions.
Why it matters. This is the first joint effort by an international organization and a national financial regulator to produce a sector-specific quantum security roadmap. The FCA’s involvement gives the principles regulatory weight beyond a typical think-tank output. The emphasis on avoiding fragmentation is directed at the real risk that major financial jurisdictions (the US, EU, UK, Singapore, Japan) will adopt incompatible PQC migration timelines and requirements, creating compliance complexity for multinational institutions. The white paper’s later recognition by the G7 Cyber Expert Group and by Central Banking’s FinTech RegTech awards suggests it is functioning as a de facto reference document for financial regulators globally.
What remains unclear. The principles are deliberately non-prescriptive: they do not set specific deadlines or mandate particular cryptographic algorithms. Whether financial regulators will translate them into binding requirements, and on what timeline, remains to be seen. The paper does not address the cost burden of PQC migration for smaller financial institutions or emerging-market banks, a gap that could undermine the “avoid fragmentation” principle in practice.
Who should care. Chief information security officers and chief risk officers at banks and financial market infrastructures. Financial regulators evaluating whether to issue quantum-specific guidance. PQC vendors seeking to position their products for the financial sector. Multilateral organizations (FSB, BIS, IMF) considering whether to develop their own quantum readiness frameworks.
Also in January 2024
The national security advisors of South Korea, the United States, and Japan celebrated the signing of a trilateral quantum workforce partnership between Seoul National University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Tokyo, following commitments made at the August 2023 Camp David summit.
India’s National Quantum Mission launched its Call for Proposals for Thematic Hubs across four quantum verticals, receiving 384 proposals from institutions nationwide and marking the first major operational step following the April 2023 Cabinet approval.
The Netherlands identified quantum technology as one of ten priority areas in its new National Technology Strategy, setting an ambition to be in the EU leading group for quantum manufacturing and commercialization by 2035.
The UK’s National Quantum Computing Centre convened the inaugural meeting of the Responsible Quantum Industry Forum, co-chaired by UKQuantum and techUK, to develop shared principles for responsible quantum innovation. Finland awarded €13 million to the Finnish Quantum Flagship project, and Sweden’s WACQT signed an agreement with IBM backed by a SEK 50 million grant to provide Swedish academia and industry with access to IBM quantum systems.
Detailed analysis of each development covered in this briefing, with cross-jurisdictional comparisons and sector-level implications, is available to Quantum Policy Radar subscribers.