February 2026 brought a concentration of strategic signals across major quantum jurisdictions. A leaked White House draft executive order outlined a whole-of-government overhaul of U.S. quantum policy, including a mandate to update the 2018 National Quantum Strategy within 180 days. Singapore announced its largest-ever research investment, with quantum technology named as a strategic priority within a S$37 billion plan. The Netherlands Court of Audit found that 71% of central government organizations had not begun preparing for the quantum cryptographic threat. India published a task force report setting hard deadlines for post-quantum cryptography migration in critical infrastructure sectors. And across the European Union, three new quantum computing systems and two major quantum communication networks became operational or launched within a single month.
United States: White House Drafts Executive Order to Reshape Quantum Policy
What happened. A draft executive order titled “Ushering In The Next Frontier Of Quantum Innovation,” obtained by Nextgov/FCW and dated February 3, 2026, would establish a whole-of-government approach to quantum information science and technology. The draft assigns a central coordinating role to the Office of Science and Technology Policy and directs OSTP, Commerce, Energy, and Defense to update the National Quantum Strategy within 180 days. Agencies would then have 30 days to report implementation plans to OSTP and the Office of Management and Budget. The order would reconstitute the expired National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee, create a national program for a quantum computer for scientific applications and discovery housed at a Department of Energy facility, task NSF with building a network of QIST education institutes, and direct the FBI to expand its quantum counterintelligence protection team. Post-quantum cryptography provisions were absent, and neither DHS nor CISA were mentioned.
Why it matters. If signed, this order would represent the most substantial update to U.S. quantum policy since the 2018 National Quantum Initiative Act. The 180-day strategy deadline and 30-day agency reporting requirement would impose concrete accountability on a policy framework that has operated without formal revision for eight years, a period during which private investment, international competition, and security concerns have all intensified. The decision to center the order on OSTP rather than any single agency signals intent to treat quantum as a cross-cutting strategic priority rather than a sector-specific research program. The omission of post-quantum cryptography is a notable gap: the order focuses on quantum technology development and protection of quantum research, but leaves the cryptographic migration effort (led by CISA under prior guidance) without new executive direction.
What remains unclear. Whether and when the order will be signed remains unknown. The draft’s relationship to the Senate’s National Quantum Initiative Reauthorization Act, introduced in early 2026 by Senators Young and Cantwell, is undefined: the executive order and legislation cover overlapping territory, and their interaction could create competing timelines or complementary mandates. The absence of PQC provisions may reflect a deliberate scope decision, a separate forthcoming order, or an oversight. The QCSAD program’s funding source and scale are not specified in the reported draft.
Who should care. U.S. federal agency CIOs and CTOs, quantum technology companies with government contracts or seeking procurement opportunities, defense and intelligence community officials, university research administrators, and organizations tracking PQC migration timelines.
Singapore: S$37 Billion Research Plan Names Quantum as Strategic Priority
What happened. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong announced on February 12 that Singapore would allocate S$37 billion (USD 27.5 billion) through its Research, Innovation and Enterprise 2030 plan, a 32% increase over the previous S$28 billion RIE 2025 allocation and the country’s largest research investment since 1991. Wong singled out quantum technology as an area where Singapore made “an early and deliberate bet” with the 2007 establishment of the Centre for Quantum Technologies. He noted that Quantinuum would host its most powerful quantum computer in Singapore by 2026 and cited a quantum computing startup co-founded by a Nobel laureate choosing Singapore for its manufacturing strengths.
Why it matters. The RIE 2030 plan positions Singapore as one of a small number of countries where quantum sits explicitly within the top tier of national research strategy, backed by specific infrastructure commitments rather than general aspirational language. The combination of a major domestic funding increase with aggressive efforts to attract international quantum companies (Quantinuum, and the unnamed Nobel laureate startup) reflects a dual strategy: building indigenous capability while serving as an Asia-Pacific hub for global quantum operations. Singapore’s small size relative to its spending intensity gives it an outsized role in shaping where quantum hardware is manufactured and deployed in the region.
What remains unclear. The quantum-specific share of the S$37 billion total has not been publicly disaggregated. Whether the Quantinuum deployment in Singapore will include customer-facing commercial access or remain oriented toward research partnerships is not fully defined. The plan’s relationship to Singapore’s earlier National Quantum Strategy (announced in 2024) and whether RIE 2030 funding triggers new procurement programs or primarily extends existing CQT and NUS activities has not been detailed.
Who should care. Quantum hardware and software companies evaluating Asia-Pacific market entry, sovereign wealth funds and institutional investors tracking quantum-adjacent industrial policy, regional governments in Southeast Asia benchmarking their own strategies, and workforce planners at universities with quantum programs.
Netherlands: Court of Audit Finds 71% of Government Unprepared for Quantum Threat
What happened. On February 4, the Netherlands Court of Audit published a report reviewing 63 national government organizations, finding that 71% had not yet started preparations to protect themselves against the quantum threat to cryptography. Most organizations had not held talks with suppliers about quantum-safe products or made plans to introduce quantum-safe cryptography. The main obstacles cited were lack of capacity, expertise, and urgency. The report noted that the AIVD warns Q-Day could arrive as early as 2030. On the opportunity side, the report found that the €615 million National Growth Fund investment had established a thriving quantum research network but that translating research into marketable applications remained a challenge. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was reported to be working on a government-wide Quantum Strategy, though specific measures and budgets had not been determined.
Why it matters. This is one of the first instances of a national audit institution conducting a systematic review of quantum preparedness across an entire government. The findings are stark: a country that has invested €615 million in quantum research and built recognized academic leadership has not translated that investment into operational readiness within its own public sector. The 71% figure provides a concrete, auditable benchmark that will likely be cited by other national audit bodies and by legislators pressing for action. The disconnect between the Netherlands’ position as a quantum research leader (home to QuTech and a major participant in EuroQCI) and the preparedness of its own government organizations illustrates a pattern visible in several countries: research funding runs well ahead of institutional readiness.
What remains unclear. The report identifies the Ministry of Economic Affairs as leading a government-wide Quantum Strategy, but no timeline, budget, or scope has been confirmed. Whether the Court of Audit’s findings will trigger binding requirements or remain advisory is not established. The report does not assess municipal or provincial government preparedness, nor does it examine critical infrastructure operators outside the central government.
Who should care. National audit institutions in other countries considering similar reviews, Dutch government IT and procurement officials, quantum-safe technology vendors targeting European public sector clients, and policymakers developing PQC migration mandates.
India: Task Force Sets 2027 Deadline for Critical Infrastructure PQC Adoption
What happened. The Department of Science and Technology, under the National Quantum Mission, published the report “Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India” on February 4. The task force report, chaired by the CEO of C-DOT, recommended a phased approach to post-quantum cryptography migration. Critical Information Infrastructure sectors, including government communications, financial services, and defense, were given a 2027 deadline for initial PQC adoption, with full nationwide adoption targeted by 2033. A four-tier National PQC Testing and Certification Program was proposed, with dedicated laboratories under agencies including TEC, STQC, and BIS to begin testing quantum-safe solutions by December 2026. The report mandated Cryptographic Bill of Materials submissions from vendors starting FY 2026-27 and prioritized indigenously developed quantum-safe products.
Why it matters. India’s report is among the most operationally specific PQC migration plans published by any government to date. The 2027 deadline for critical infrastructure sectors is aggressive, particularly given that NIST finalized its first three PQC standards only in 2024, and most countries have not set binding sector-specific timelines. The Cryptographic Bill of Materials requirement, if enforced, would give India one of the earliest vendor transparency mandates in quantum-safe procurement. The emphasis on indigenously developed products adds an industrial policy dimension: this is not just a cybersecurity migration plan but a mechanism for building domestic quantum-safe technology capabilities under the broader National Quantum Mission.
What remains unclear. The report was opened for public comment until February 19, and it is not yet confirmed whether the recommended timelines will be adopted as binding policy or remain advisory. The capacity of the proposed testing laboratories to be operational by December 2026 is untested. How India’s approach will interact with international standards processes, and whether the preference for indigenous products will create compatibility issues with global supply chains, remain open questions.
Who should care. CISOs and compliance teams at financial institutions, telecommunications providers, and defense contractors operating in India, international PQC solution vendors evaluating the Indian market, other governments developing their own migration timelines, and standards bodies tracking national implementation of NIST PQC standards.
European Union: Quantum Computing and Communication Infrastructure Expands Rapidly
What happened. February saw a concentrated burst of EU quantum infrastructure activity. On February 12, the Euro-Q-Exa quantum computer was inaugurated at the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre in Munich, a 54-qubit superconducting system supplied by IQM with a planned upgrade to 150 qubits by year-end. On February 17, a 140-qubit neutral atom system built by Pasqal arrived at CINECA in Bologna as the EuroQCS-Italy quantum computer, integrated into the Leonardo pre-exascale supercomputer. On February 26, IonQ announced the deployment of the Romanian RoNaQCI quantum key distribution network, spanning 36 quantum-secured links over 1,500 kilometers across six metropolitan areas and accounting for more than 20% of Europe’s terrestrial quantum communications infrastructure. The same day, the SEEWQCI cross-border quantum corridor project launched in Athens, connecting Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands through a 1,100 km terrestrial QKD backbone and five optical ground stations, with a total budget of €17.8 million.
Why it matters. The pace of deployment in February illustrates the EU’s infrastructure-first approach to quantum policy entering its operational phase. The EuroHPC quantum computing program now has three systems online (following PIAST-Q in Poland and VLQ in Czechia), with EuroQCS-Italy adding a fourth using a different hardware modality (neutral atoms versus superconducting qubits). This multi-platform strategy gives European researchers access to diverse quantum architectures through a common access framework. On the communications side, RoNaQCI and SEEWQCI mark the transition from national pilot networks to large-scale, cross-border quantum communication infrastructure. The shift from isolated testbeds to interconnected continental networks is where the EuroQCI program’s real policy logic becomes visible: creating physical infrastructure that makes quantum-safe communication a practical option for government and critical infrastructure operators.
What remains unclear. Utilization rates for the new EuroHPC quantum computers are not yet reported, and whether the available qubit counts (54 and 140) will attract meaningful research demand or primarily serve as testbeds remains to be seen. The interoperability of QKD systems across national EuroQCI deployments, particularly between different vendors (ID Quantique in Romania, potentially different suppliers in other countries), is a technical and procurement question that will shape the network’s long-term viability. The SEEWQCI project’s 29 planned use cases are described in outline, but which will advance beyond pilot demonstrations is uncertain.
Who should care. European research institutions and industry users seeking quantum computing access, telecommunications operators and network equipment vendors in the QKD supply chain, national cybersecurity agencies in EU member states, and policymakers in non-EU countries evaluating whether to pursue similar infrastructure programs.
Also in February 2026
UNESCO held the closing ceremony of the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology in Accra, Ghana on February 10-11, formally launching the Global Quantum Initiative (GQI) for 2026-2028 with a $3.6 million budget. Ghana’s Minister of Education noted that about 140 countries have yet to develop national quantum strategies.
Australia announced two separate quantum funding actions: a AU$20 million strategic equity investment by the National Reconstruction Fund in Diraq, a silicon quantum dot startup, and AU$12.7 million for eight proof-of-concept quantum technology projects under the Critical Technologies Challenge Program, covering applications from rare-earth sensing to neurological drug discovery.
Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries outlined 2026 quantum procurement targets including contracts for superconducting quantum processing units and quantum magnetometers for GNSS-independent navigation and submarine detection, the first publicly announced defense procurement actions targeting quantum hardware in Turkey.
Kazakhstan and Singapore inaugurated the Kazakh-Singaporean Center for Quantum Technologies at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, launching a quantum cryptography and communications laboratory as its first phase, with representatives from Kazakhstan’s ministries of defense, digital development, and energy in attendance.
Detailed analysis of each development in this briefing, with cross-jurisdictional comparisons, sector-level implications, and policy timeline tracking, is available to Quantum Policy Radar subscribers.