September 2024 marked the most consequential month for quantum export controls to date, with the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and Finland implementing coordinated restrictions on quantum computing items within days of each other. India gave operational shape to its National Quantum Mission by designating four thematic research hubs. NATO’s Innovation Fund made its first investment in a quantum company, signaling that alliance capital is now flowing directly into the sector. The G7 Cyber Expert Group issued a targeted statement on quantum computing risks to the financial system, while Russia and BRICS announced plans for quantum technology cooperation, deepening the contours of a bifurcated global quantum order.
United States and Allies: Coordinated Quantum Export Controls Take Effect
What happened. On September 6, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule implementing new plurilateral export controls on quantum computing items, advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and additive manufacturing technologies. The rule added 18 new Export Control Classification Numbers and created a new License Exception for Implemented Export Controls (IEC), initially covering Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Within days, Japan’s parallel amendments to its Export Control Order took effect on September 8, covering cryogenic CMOS circuits, scanning electron microscopes for semiconductor imaging, and GAAFET transistor technology. The Netherlands expanded its national controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment on September 7, and Finland’s new dual-use export control act entered into force on September 15, imposing for the first time national controls on quantum computers and their components. Finland was subsequently added to the U.S. IEC license exception list on September 17.
Why it matters. This is the first time quantum computing has been the subject of a coordinated, plurilateral export control action. The speed and breadth of implementation, with four jurisdictions enacting controls within a ten-day window, reflects months of diplomatic preparation and signals that quantum technology has firmly entered the category of strategically controlled goods alongside advanced semiconductors and nuclear technologies. The IEC license exception creates a tiered system: allied nations that implement equivalent controls gain preferential treatment, while countries in restrictive Country Groups (such as D:1 and D:5) face the most stringent licensing requirements. This architecture incentivizes alignment with U.S. control frameworks and could become a template for future technology regimes. The controls cover not just quantum computers themselves but the full stack, including cryogenic cooling systems, components, materials, software, and associated technology, a scope that will affect supply chains well beyond finished hardware.
What remains unclear. How will BIS evaluate whether allied nations’ controls are truly “equivalent,” and what happens if implementations diverge over time? The interim final rule accepted public comments through November 5, 2024, leaving open the possibility of significant revision. It is also unclear how effectively these controls can be enforced given the dual-use nature of many controlled components (such as cryogenic systems with applications in non-quantum research). The treatment of quantum workforce mobility, where foreign nationals from restricted countries face reporting requirements rather than outright license denials, suggests regulators recognize the tension between security restrictions and the international character of quantum research, but the practical consequences for university labs and corporate R&D remain untested.
Who should care. Quantum hardware companies and their component suppliers worldwide; university research groups employing foreign nationals on quantum projects; export compliance officers at firms dealing in cryogenic, semiconductor, or quantum computing equipment; trade policy officials in countries not yet on the IEC exception list.
India: National Quantum Mission Designates Four Thematic Hubs
What happened. On September 30, India’s Union Minister of State for Science and Technology announced the establishment of four Thematic Hubs under the National Quantum Mission. IISc Bengaluru was selected for quantum computing, IIT Madras with C-DOT New Delhi for quantum communication, IIT Bombay for quantum sensing and metrology, and IIT Delhi for quantum materials and devices. The hubs were chosen from 384 proposals and encompass 14 Technical Groups with 152 researchers from 43 institutions across 17 states and 2 Union Territories. The NQM also released guidelines for nurturing quantum technology startups.
Why it matters. After the NQM’s approval in April 2023 with a budget of INR 6,003.65 crore (approximately $720 million), the designation of thematic hubs is the first major structural step toward implementation. India’s approach of distributing hubs across premier institutions, rather than concentrating resources in a single center, reflects both the breadth of its academic base and the political logic of geographic distribution. The inclusion of startup-nurturing guidelines alongside the hub announcements suggests the government wants to connect basic research to commercial pathways from the outset. With the Quad’s Wilmington Declaration also reaffirming support for the QUIN quantum activities, India’s quantum program is now embedded in both its domestic industrial policy and its multilateral strategic partnerships.
What remains unclear. How much funding flows to each hub, and on what timeline? The NQM’s total budget is allocated across multiple pillars, but the distribution between computing, communication, sensing, and materials has not been specified publicly. Whether the 43 participating institutions will receive meaningful resources or remain nominally associated is an open question. The startup guidelines have been announced but their content and the scale of any associated funding have not been detailed.
Who should care. Indian quantum researchers and technology startups; international companies exploring R&D partnerships with Indian institutions; Quad partner governments tracking NQM implementation; venture investors assessing the Indian quantum ecosystem.
NATO Innovation Fund: First Quantum Investment Signals Alliance Capital Flowing Into Sector
What happened. On September 19, the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) led a EUR 5 million seed round in Aquark Technologies, a UK-based quantum sensing company. This was the NIF’s first investment in a quantum technology company and the first investment in a company from NATO’s DIANA accelerator cohort. The round also included EIFO (Denmark’s export and investment fund), UKI2S, and MBDA. Aquark had participated in DIANA’s Deep Tech Lab for Quantum in Copenhagen, selected in November 2023.
Why it matters. The NIF is a EUR 1 billion, 15-year venture fund backed by 24 NATO Allies. Its first quantum investment, in a sensing company with applications in positioning, navigation, and timing, indicates that the alliance’s investment thesis prioritizes near-term deployable quantum capabilities over longer-horizon computing breakthroughs. The choice of a DIANA cohort company also validates the accelerator-to-investment pipeline that NATO has been constructing since 2022. For the broader quantum industry, this represents a new category of institutional capital: alliance-backed venture funding that carries both financial and strategic signaling value.
What remains unclear. How many additional quantum investments the NIF plans to make, and whether it will invest across the full technology stack or concentrate on sensing and PNT applications with clear defense utility. The fund’s investment criteria for quantum companies, and its tolerance for the long development timelines typical in the sector, have not been publicly articulated. Whether NIF portfolio status will create export control or intellectual property complications for companies seeking commercial customers outside NATO member states is also unresolved.
Who should care. European and allied quantum startups, particularly in sensing and PNT; defense-focused venture investors; NATO member state defense procurement officials; DIANA program managers.
G7 Cyber Expert Group Issues First Statement on Quantum Risk to Financial Sector
What happened. On September 25, the G7 Cyber Expert Group, co-chaired by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Bank of England, released a public statement identifying quantum computing as a cybersecurity risk to the financial system. The statement encouraged financial authorities and institutions to monitor quantum computing developments, promote public-private collaboration, and begin planning for the transition to quantum-resilient cryptography. Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Todd Conklin stated that planning for the quantum transition “is important to economic security and prosperity.”
Why it matters. This is the first G7-level statement to address quantum computing risk specifically within the financial sector. While national cybersecurity agencies (including NIST, BSI, and ANSSI) have been issuing guidance on post-quantum cryptography migration for some time, the G7 CEG statement brings financial regulators into the conversation as a coordinated group. The timing, following NIST’s finalization of post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, positions the statement as a call to begin implementation rather than merely to study the issue. Financial institutions that have delayed action on cryptographic migration now face pressure from their primary international regulatory coordination body.
What remains unclear. Whether the statement will translate into binding regulatory expectations or remains advisory. The CEG operates as a coordination body rather than a standard-setter, so its influence depends on individual G7 financial authorities incorporating quantum risk into their supervisory frameworks. Whether non-G7 financial centers will follow the CEG’s lead, and how smaller financial institutions with limited technical capacity will approach the transition, are significant practical questions.
Who should care. Chief information security officers and chief technology officers at banks, insurers, and market infrastructure providers; financial regulators in G7 and non-G7 jurisdictions; post-quantum cryptography vendors and consultancies targeting the financial sector.
Russia: 50-Qubit Milestone and BRICS Quantum Cooperation Plans
What happened. On September 23, Rosatom General Director Alexei Likhachev announced the completion of a 50-qubit ion-based quantum computer, meeting Russia’s national roadmap target ahead of its year-end deadline. The device was developed by the Russian Quantum Center and the Lebedev Physical Institute with total program funding of 24 billion rubles (approximately $292 million) from 2020 to 2024. Days later, Russian Digital Minister Maksut Shadaev announced that BRICS countries had agreed to cooperate on quantum technology development, ahead of the October 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan.
Why it matters. Russia’s 50-qubit ion trap claim, while modest by the standards of leading Western and Chinese systems, represents continued progress under conditions of severe sanctions and technology export restrictions. The simultaneous announcement of BRICS quantum cooperation suggests Russia is positioning itself as a coordinator of quantum collaboration among non-Western states, potentially creating an alternative technology alignment to the one forming around U.S.-allied export control regimes. The juxtaposition is striking: in the same month that the U.S. and allies tightened quantum export controls, Russia announced both a domestic milestone and a new multilateral cooperation framework.
What remains unclear. Independent verification of the 50-qubit system’s performance characteristics, including gate fidelities and coherence times, has not been published. Whether BRICS quantum cooperation will produce substantive joint research programs or remain at the level of declarations is uncertain. The practical scope of cooperation is constrained by the significant disparities in quantum capability among BRICS members, with China far ahead of other members. Whether China, which has its own advanced quantum programs and typically guards its technology closely, will share meaningful quantum capabilities through a BRICS framework is a central question.
Who should care. Western intelligence and export control agencies assessing Russian quantum capabilities; analysts tracking BRICS institutional development; quantum companies in non-aligned countries weighing partnership options; researchers studying technology decoupling dynamics.
Romania: National Quantum Strategy Approved for 2024-2029
What happened. Romania’s government approved the National Strategy for Quantum Technologies (SNTC) for 2024-2029, establishing a roadmap to position the country as a regional hub within the European quantum ecosystem. The strategy creates two new institutional bodies: a National Authority for Quantum Sciences and Technologies (ANSTC) and a Quantum Innovation Center (QIC). It covers quantum-safe cryptography, secure communications, workforce development, and technology commercialization.
Why it matters. Romania joins a growing list of EU member states with dedicated quantum strategies, but the creation of a standalone national authority for quantum sciences sets it apart from countries that have housed quantum coordination within existing research or digital ministries. The strategy’s emphasis on becoming a regional hub reflects Romania’s positioning within the broader EuroHPC and EU Quantum Flagship frameworks. Whether the institutional architecture can attract meaningful investment and talent to a country without an established quantum research base will be a test of whether national strategies alone can bootstrap a quantum ecosystem.
What remains unclear. The strategy’s budget has not been publicly detailed. Whether the ANSTC and QIC will receive sufficient staffing and authority to coordinate across ministries and agencies is unknown. The timeline for establishing the operational committee on quantum competences (COCC) and its relationship to existing EU-level coordination mechanisms has not been specified.
Who should care. EU quantum policy officials monitoring national strategy alignment; Romanian universities and research institutions; quantum companies considering Eastern European expansion; EuroHPC consortium partners.
Also in September 2024
The Czech Republic’s NUKIB endorsed a joint European position paper prioritizing post-quantum cryptography over quantum key distribution, adding to the growing European consensus that PQC migration, not QKD deployment, should be the near-term focus for cryptographic security.
The Australian Department of Defence acquired quantum optical atomic clocks from QuantX Labs under AU$2.7 million in contracts for AUKUS Pillar II positioning, navigation, and timing trials, an early example of quantum sensing hardware entering allied defense procurement pipelines.
The AUKUS third anniversary statement announced that Japan is exploring cooperation on maritime autonomous systems, while consultations with Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea on Pillar II collaboration continue, potentially widening the circle of nations involved in allied quantum technology development.
The EuroHPC Joint Undertaking signed a procurement contract with IQM for the LUMI-Q quantum computer to be installed in Ostrava, Czech Republic, a 24-qubit superconducting system costing approximately EUR 5 million that will be integrated with classical HPC infrastructure.
Structured analysis of each development in this briefing, with cross-jurisdictional context and sector-level implications, is available to Quantum Policy Radar subscribers.